American Realism in the Early 20th Century
 
 

 

 

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Abstract

Direct realism in epistemology and the philosophy of mind is the view that perception is not mediated by representational means such as concepts or ideas but that things are perceived directly. More recently, this position has experienced an unexpected renaissance. However, direct realism had its heydays during the first two decades of the twentieth century, especially among the “new” realists in the UK (e.g. Bertrand Russell) and the United States (e.g. Ralph Barton Perry). The aim of this Special Issue and the preceding two-day workshop, which was held in October 2022 in Mainz, is to bring together historical and systematic perspectives on the direct realist conception. It is thus hoped that both perspectives will more thoroughly benefit from each other than to date.




Abstract

Alois Riehl was one of the few Kantian-inspired philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who argued for a realist approach to Kant's original doctrine. He therefore rejected prevailing idealist reconstructions and attempted to establish a view of Kant as an important forerunner of what he programmatically called 'critical realism.' In the present paper it will be shown what this exactly meant for the interpretation of Kant's and especially Riehl's own critique of idealism as a systematic position. In particular, it is stated that anti-idealism in Riehlian terms amounts to a 'realistic rehabilitation' of Kantian things-in-themselves. Furthermore, some connections are drawn to early-twentieth century American realism.




  • Neuber, M. (2023). Perception in Plato's Heaven? Santayana and the "Essence Wing" of American Critical Realism. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XV-2 http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/3403

Abstract

American critical realism was defended in two versions, an “essentialist” and an “empirical.” The main proponent of the essentialist version was George Santayana, who in his Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923) outlined a critical realist account of epistemology based substantially on an articulate doctrine of essences. In the present paper, an attempt is made to critically examine the resulting approach, particularly in relation to perception. It will be argued that Santayana failed to develop a sufficiently convincing essentialist view of perception, and that his actual significance in terms of the impact of the critical realist movement was, contrary to what is often claimed, quite limited.




  • Neuber, M. (2023). Special Relativity from the Viewpoint of R. W. Sellars' The Philosophy of Physical Realism. In: Russo Krauss, C., Laino, L. (eds), Philosophers and Einstein's Relativity. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 342. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36498-3_7

Abstract

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, '30s, and '40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars' philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein's special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein's theory, as it can be found in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an "ars mensurandi" and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. "Real" time and "absolute" simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein's respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski's world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars' later approach from the 1940s and '50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically 'grounding' special relativistic kinematics.




  • Neuber, M. (2023). Idealismus, "neuer" Realismus und die Anfänge der analytischen Philosophie in den Vereinigten Staaten. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0014

Abstract

Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement.




Abstract

American philosophical realism developed in two forms: “new” and “critical” realism. While the new realists sought to ‘emancipate’ ontology from epistemology and defended a direct theory of perception, the critical realists promoted a representationalist account of perception and thus argued for an epistemological dualism. Bertrand Russell’s early philosophical writings figured prominently in both of these American realist camps. However, while the new realists quite enthusiastically embraced the Russellian analytic style of reasoning (and Russell himself appreciated the American new realists as anti-idealist allies), the critical realists were significantly more reserved toward Russell’s point of view. In the present paper, I identify the reasons for this difference in reception. In particular, I will show that the critical realists’ reservations pertained primarily to a more traditionalist—‘continental’—account of philosophy, whereas the neo-realists proved instrumental in setting the stage for later full-blown analytic philosophy in the United States.




  • Neuber, M. (2022). Perry, the ‘Ego-Centric Predicament’, and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy in the United States. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.36

Abstract

This paper examines Ralph Barton Perry's analysis of the ‘ego-centric predicament’. It will be shown that Perry convincingly argued against prevailing contemporary versions of idealism and that it makes perfectly good sense to consider him a precursor of subsequent trends in American analytic philosophy. Perry's appraisal and promotion of the contemporary logic of relations in the framework of early twentieth-century American neorealism provides further evidence of his being a proto-analytic philosopher. His personal acquaintance with Bertrand Russell proved instructive in this regard. On the whole, Perry's distinctive approach to philosophy was instrumental in establishing the analytic style of reasoning in the United States. This paper is devoted to substantiating this claim. It is thus hoped that a clearer picture of early twentieth-century American philosophy will begin to emerge.




Abstract

The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, (1) that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and (2) that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed.




  • Neuber, M. (2022). What We Talk About When We Talk About This Being Blue: C. I. Lewis and R. W. Sellars on the Object of Perception. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XIV-1. https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2804

Abstract

The relationship between American pragmatism and American critical realism needs to be reconsidered. The two currents shared many aspects, but there were also significant differences. One of these differences pertains to the object of perception or, more precisely, to the question of what we talk about when we talk about this, for example, being blue. By re-addressing that question, some light can be shed on the historical development of analytic philosophy in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. My case in point is the respective positions of C. I. Lewis and R. W. Sellars. I shall point out that Sellars’s view has more to recommend it because it provides a more compelling framework for a comprehensive explanation of perception.




  • Neuber, M. (2020). Two Forms of American Critical Realism: Perception and Reality in Santayana/Strong and Sellars. HOPOS: the Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 10(1), 76–105. http://doi.org/10.1086/707651

Abstract

American critical realism emerged in two forms: an 'essentialist' version defended, with some significant divergences, by George Santayana and C. A. Strong, and an 'empirical' version primarily defended by Roy Wood Sellars. Both forms of American critical realism aimed at an epistemologically convincing 'representationalist' account of perception. However, they were divided over issues of ontology. While Santayana and Strong invoked the notion of essence in order to ontologically reinforce their epistemological conceptions, Sellars attempted a more empirical, evolution-based approach. It will be argued that Sellars's view has more to recommend it because it better explains the actual mechanism of perceptual representation.




  • Neuber, M. (2019). Between Pragmatism and Realism - The Philosophy of John Elof Boodin. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1547

Abstract

This paper explores the philosophical approach of the Swedish-born thinker John Elof Boodin. It will be shown that Boodin’s philosophical development ran through various stages, beginning with more or less "orthodox" pragmatism and ending with what he labeled "functional" realism. My principal thesis is that, in the last analysis, Boodin failed in establishing a stable systematic point of view. However, his philosophical development is worth considering in some detail because it nicely reflects the situation of a European-born philosopher in early-twentieth century America.




Abstract

It is shown that Külpe's critical realism anticipates several elements of modern scientific realism. Furthermore, a comparison with contemporary American critical realism is drawn. On the whole, it is argued that more intensive relevant research in the future is needed.